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Necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  are  given  under  which  a  decision  maker’s  van  Neumann-Morgenstern  utility  function  on 
the  Cartesian  product  of  two  prospect  spaces  can  be  expressed  as  a  sum  of  coordinate  utility  functions,  assuming  that  all 
preferences  are  given.  A  main  motivation  for  this  result  is  an  application  in  axiomatic  bargaining  theory. 
1. Introduction 
Keeney  and  Raiffa  (1976,  p.  231),  following  Fishburn  (1965),  give  a  necessary  and  sufficient 
condition  under  which  a  von  Neumann-Morgenstern  utility  function  on  the  product  of  two  given 
prospect  spaces  can  be  written  as  a  scaled  sum  of  coordinate  utility  functions.  We  shall  extend  this 
result  to  the  case  where  these  coordinate  utility  functions  represent  given  preferences. 
We  adopt  the  following  notational  conventions.  Capital  Latin  letters  will  always  denote  prospect 
spaces.  Small  Latin  letters  (possibly  with  superscipts)  denote  elements  of  prospect  spaces  or  their 
lottery  sets  (see  below),  e.g.,  a,  a’,  u”,  ai,  . . .  E A  or  E  L(A).  Small  Greek  letters  denote  numbers  in 
[O,l];  indexed,  they  are  supposed  to  sum  up  to  1.  The  expression  ‘for  all  . . . ’  is  omitted  when 
confusion  is  improbable. 
For  a  prospect  space  P,  we  denote  by  L(P)  the  set  of finite  lotteries  on  P.  A  typical  element  of 
L(P)  is  denoted  Cy_tpip’  which  is  to  be  interpreted  as  the  prospect  pi  resulting  with  probability  CL,. 
The  lottery  operation  is  supposed  to  satisfy  the  familiar  laws  of  commutativity  and  associativity.  The 
sure  prospect  p  E  P  will  be  identified  with  any  lottery  resulting  in  p  with  probability  1. 
A  preference  relation  > p  on  L(P)  is  a complete  and  transitive  binary  relation  on  L(P).  By  > p 
and  =p  we  denote  the  corresponding  strict  (antisymmetric)  preference  and  indifference  relations, 
respectively.  The  meaning  of  <  ,,  and  <  p  should  be  obvious.  For  any  P  and  >  p we  assume,  in  the 
sequel,  that  p  > pp’  for  some  p,  p’  E P.  Herstein  and  Milnor  (1953)  provide  a  set  of  necessary  and 
sufficient  axioms  for  2  p  to  be  representable  by  a  uon  Neumann-Morgenstern  (vNM)  utility  function 
u:  L(P)  -+ R,  i.e.,  u  satisfies 
4  P)  >  4 P')  iff  P  >  pi’,  0) 
u 
i  I 
:  P,P’  = ,gW(  P’).  (2) 
r=l 
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v=ku+l  where  k,lER,  k>O.  (3) 
If  p,  p’,  p”  E  L(P)  with  p  > pp’  > pp”  and  p  > pp”,  then  there  exists  a  unique  p  with 
P’=P  I*p+(l  -PIP”.  (4) 
Any  preference  relation  occurring  in  the  sequel  is  assumed  to  be  representable  by  a  vNM  utility 
function.  Let  A,  B,  and  C := A  X B  be  prospect  spaces  for  a  decision  maker.  Keeney  and  Raiffa 
(1976,  p.  231)  show  that  under  the  assumption  of  additive  independence  (see  section  2)  on  >  =,  a 
vNM  utility  function  w  for  >  c  can  be  written  as  k,w,  + kSwB  where  k,  and  k,  are  positive 
constants  and  w,  and  wB are  induced  utility  functions  on  L(A)  and  L(B).  In  the  present  note  we 
shall  extend  this  result  to  the  case  where  w,  and  w,  represent  given  preference  relations  on  L(A)  and 
L(B).  Section  2  introduces  the  axioms  and  section  3 contains  the  main  result.  A  motivation  for  this 
result  is  an  application,  in  section  4,  to  axiomatic  bargaining  theory. 
2.  The  axioms 
Let  A,  B,  and  C =  A  x  B  be  prospect  spaces  with  >  A,  >  R  and  >  c  a  decision  maker’s 
preference  relations  on  the  corresponding  lottery  sets.  We  start  with  a  weaker  version  of  the  udditioe 
independence  axiom  [cf.  Keeney  and  Raiffa  (1976,  p.  230)]: 
A.I.  For  any  a,  a’,  6,  b’we  have  j(u,  b)+  i(u’.  b’)=.f(u,  b’)+  i(u’,  b). 
Notice  that,  by  the  natural  identification 
wemayput  L(A)xL(B)cL(C). 
If  2  c  satisfies  A.l,  then  for  CT_i  ~,(a’,  b’) E  L(C)  we  have 
?  /-~,(a’,  b’)=  5 P,P,((~  b’)  +(a’,  bJ))  +  2  ~;(a’.  b’), 
/=l  />I=1  r=l 
bJ)  + ;(aJ,  b’))  +  f  pLf(u’,  b’), 
r=l 
=  2 pipJ(u’,  b’)  =  F  /~,a’,  5  p,b’  , 
I./-1  ! ,=l  r=l  i 
(5) 
(6) 
where  the  second  step  follows,  by  using  (2)  from  A.l,  the  last  step  from  (5)  and  all  the  other  steps 
from  properties  of  lotteries.  So  (5)  and  (6)  together  enable  us  to  identify  L(A)  X L(B)  with  L(C) 
if  asc  satisfies  A.l.  The  obvious  interpretation  of  A.l.  is  that  the  decision  maker  only  cares  for  what 
he  gets  in  L(A)  and  L(B),  and  not  for  the  specific  combination. 
The  second  axiom  relates  >  c  with  >  A and  >  a,  and  is  an  axiom  of  weak  monotonicity: A.2.  There  exist  a0  and  b”  with  (a’,  b)  2  c(a  ‘,  b’) *  h >  gb’  and  (a,  b”)  >  c( a’,  b”)  *  a 2  Au’  for 
all  a,  u’  and  b,  6’. 
3.  Main  result 
Our  main  result  is  the  following  extension  of  Keeney  and  Raiffa  (1976,  Theorem  5.1). 
Theorem  1.  Let  A,  B,  C,  > A, > n,  and  > c  be  us  in  section  2.  The  following  two  statements  are 
equivalent: 
(i>  ac satisfies  A.l,  and  >, A, > B,  and  >, c  satisfy  A.2. 
(ii)  There  exist  vNM  representations  u,  v  and  w  for  > A, > B  and  >, c,  respectively,  and  positive 
constants  k,  and  k,,.,  with  w(a,  b) = k,u(u)  + k,v(b)  for  all  a,  b. 
Proof.  The  implication  (ii)  =j  (i)  is  straightforward.  For  (i) 3  (ii),  let  u”  and  b”  be  as  in  A.2.  Take 
ci E A,  6 E  B  with  ri f  Auo  and  b f  r,b”. In  view  of  (3)  we  can  choose  vNM  representations  u  and  v 
for  >  A and  ;:  B such  that  ~(a’)  =  v(b’)  = 0,  and  u(G)  and  v(h)  arbitrary  [but  consistent  with  (l)]. 
Also,  fix  w  for  >  c  by  w(a’,  ho)  = 0 and  ~(2,  b”) = u(B),  noting  that  w( ri,  b”)  and  u(a)  must  have 
the  same  sign  by  A.2.  Similarly,  k,  := ~(a’,  b)/v(b)  > 0. 
By  applying  A.1  and  (2)  we  have  for  all  a  and  b:  +~(a,  b)  +  $( u”,  b”) =  +~(a,  b”) +  iw(  u',  b), 
hence  w( a,  b)  = w( a,  b”) + w( u”,  b).  The  proof  is  finished  (with  k,  = 1) if  we  show  w( a,  b”) = u(a) 
and  w( a’,  b)  = k,,v(  b)  for  all  a  and  b.  We  only  prove  the  first  equality,  and  distinguish  three  cases: 
(I)  (a.  b”)  <  &a’,  6’)  and  ( a,  bO)<  c(ri,  b’),  (2)  (a,  b’)>,  =(a’,  b”)  and  (a,  b’)>,  Ja,  be),  and  (3) 
the  remaining  case  in  which,  by  (4)  (a,  6’)  = cp(ci,  b”) + (1 -  ~)(a’,  b”)  for  a  unique  p #  0. 
We  only  consider  the  last  case,  the  other  ones  are  similar.  In  that  case,  w(u,  b”) = pw(  5,  b”) = 
pu(ri)  = pu(u)/p  = u(u).  Here,  the  third  equality  follows  from  a =,+,(l  -  p)u”  +  @,  which  again 
follows  by  A.2  from  (a,  ho) =c(pLci  +  (1 -  ~)a’,  b’),  which  again,  by  (6),  follows  from  our  starting 
point  (a,  b’)=.p(ci,  b’)+(l  -  ~)(a’,  ho).  Q.E.D. 
Remark  1.  Suppose,  in  Theorem  1,  that  (i)  holds,  and  that  there  are  already  given  vNM  utility 
functions  u  and  v with  ~(a’)  =  v(b”)  = 0.  Suppose  further  that  ii  and  2, as  in  the  above  proof  exist 
such  that  u(a)=  u(a)  and  (a,  b”) =c(u’,  8).  Then  k,  = k,,,  in  particular  we  may  set  k,  = k,, = 1. 
4.  An  application  in  axiomatic  bargaining  theory 
Let  P  be  a prospect  space  with  d,  3  E P,  and  u  and  u  vNM  utility  functions  on  L(P),  such  that 
u(d)#u(p)=O=v(p)+v(d).Aburguiningsituutionisaset  Awith{j,d}cAcP,ofwhichthe 
interpretation  is  that  there  are  two  bargainers  with  utility  functions  u  and  v  restricted  to  L(A),  who 
may  reach  an  agreement  a E L(A),  or  get  the  conflict  point  p  E A.  The  point  d  is  interpreted  as  an 
always  available  alternative.  Let  G  denote  the  family  of  all  such  bargaining  situations.  Further,  we 
assume  that  for  any  bargainer  and  any  A,  B E  G  and  C =  A  X B,  axioms  A.1  and  A.2  are  satisfied  for 
>,,a.  anda,.,  with  u”  =  b” = p,  and  that  moreover  ( j,  d)  = c(d,  p).  Here  C  is  called  the 
simultaneous  bargaining  situation  corresponding  to A  and  B.  A  solution  cp is  a map  assigning,  for  all  A, 
B~G,elementscp(A)~L(A),  T(B)EL(B),  cp(AxB)~L(c). 
Profitability  of  simultaneous  bargaining  can  be  expressed  by  the  following  axiom  for  ‘p: 
S.I.  For  all  A,  B  E  G,  both  bargainers  (weakly)  prefer  ‘p( A  x  B)  to  (cp( A),  cp(  B)). 222  H.  Peren  /  Addrtwe  uttlity  and  horguintng 
This  axiom  can  be  translated  into  utility  space  by  means  of  Theorem  1 and  especially  Remark  1  (with 
ci =  2, =  d).  It  is  not  difficult  to  verify,  then,  that  S.l  translates  into: 
S.2.  @(S,  +  S,)>  @(S,)  + @(S,)  for  all  A,  B  E  G. 
Here  S,  := {(u(a),  u(a))  : a E  L(A))  and  +(S,)  :=  (u(q(A)),  u(Q$A))),  and  +(s,  +  s,)  := 
(uJcp(C)),  uC(cp(C)))  where  +(a,  6)  =  u(a)  +  u(h)  and  +(a,  b)  =  u(u)  + u(b)  for  all  a  and  h. 
Axiom  S.2  is  known  in  axiomatic  bargaining  theory  as  super-udditioity  [Peters  (1983),  Perles  and 
Maschler  (198l)J.  In  the  present  note  we  hope  to  have  succeeded  in  giving  a  foundation,  in  underlying 
bargaining  situations  A  rather  than  in  bargaining  games  S,  for  the  use  of  the  super-additivitity 
axiom. 
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